It may be difficult for a real-estate mogul like Donald Trump to recognize, but Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is not about slices of war-torn land in eastern Ukraine. It is about Ukraine’s democracy. Putin fears that the Russian people will see that democracy as an enticing alternative to his stultifying autocratic rule. Trump is unlikely to secure a peace deal unless he acts on that reality and changes the cost-benefit analysis behind Putin’s continuing war.
Much of the public analysis of the Alaska summit between Trump and Putin, and the Washington collection of European leaders protecting the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, from the temperamental Trump, has been replete with red-herring issues. For example, Putin did not invade Ukraine because of feared Nato expansion. The unanimous consent of all Nato members required to admit Ukraine is nowhere on the horizon, especially since article 5 of the Nato treaty would require all Nato members to defend Ukraine from the ongoing Russian incursion.
Ironically, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened Nato. It encouraged Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. It led Nato members to vow to dramatically increase their defense expenditures to 5% of their gross domestic product. And it has made some Nato members more likely to deploy troops in Ukraine as part of a “reassurance force” to secure a possible peace deal.
Nor did Putin invade to liberate the Ukrainian people from the rule of Zelenskyy, whom he regards as illegitimate and even a “neo-nazi”. This claim is rich because Zelenskyy was chosen in a free and fair electionwhile Putin risked only an electoral charade while imprisoning, ultimately lethallyhis most charismatic opponent, Alexei Navalny.
And the war is not about Putin’s pining to resurrect the Soviet Union, whose collapse he sees as “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. That logic would endanger the other 13 former Soviet states, three of which – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are Nato members.
Rather, Putin invaded Ukraine to quash its democracy. Unlike the established democracies of Europe, Ukraine looks too much like Russia for Putin to ignore the possibility that Russians will see an alternative future in its accountable, elected government. Like Russia, Ukraine is Slavic and Orthodox. And far from a small statelet, Ukraine, with the second largest population among post-Soviet states after Russia, cannot be ignored.
Putin has long preferred Ukraine as a Kremlin vassal state. The Euromailan protests of 2013-14, which ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych after he suspended talks for a closer relationship with the European Union, led to Putin’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea and parts of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.
Today, Putin’s most controversial demands would enhance the possibility of Kyiv’s renewed subordination. His insistence that Ukraine hand over large portions of Donetsk province – the “land swaps” that Trump casually suggests – would relinquish far more land than Russia has managed to take by force since November 2022, at enormous cost in Russian soldiers’ lives – land that had been home to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians.
It would also force Ukrainian forces to abandon key defensive lines – Ukraine’s “fortress belt’’ – that stand in the way of Russian seizure of much larger chunks of territory. Comparisons with Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 appeasement of Adolf Hitler by sacrificing Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland – a prelude to war – would be inevitable. Putin’s demand that Ukraine disarm would make Russia’s further aggression even easier.
Precluding that possibility is why security guarantees are so important for Ukraine. Given that Putin has a history of ignoring agreements with Ukraine, Kyiv reasonably wants some assurance that the Russian military will not use a lull in the fighting to replenish its diminished forces, rearm and reinvade. The best guarantee would be a European peacekeeping force on the ground, but European governments understandably seek a US backstop to deter Russian attack. Trump’s stated willingness to consider air support for a European force is an important step forward. The Russian government’s insistence on the power to veto any security guarantees raises obvious questions about Putin’s intentions.
For now, Putin seems to see advantage in continuing the war. To avoid angering Trump, he hasn’t outright refused to meet with Zelenskyy but is slow-walking the matter by insisting on time-consuming prior steps. Given that Putin’s quest to undermine Ukraine’s democracy stems from his calculation of what it takes to retain power, the only way to soften his maximalist demands is by making his recalcitrance even more politically costly.
This is where Trump has a role to play. Entering the Alaska summit, Trump had threatened “severe consequences” if Putin did not agree to a ceasefire. The mercurial Trump then seemingly abandoned that threat after a few hours with Putin.
Trump could take various steps that would force Putin to recalibrate the rationale for his war. Trump could increase the supply of arms to Ukraine. He could further use tariffs to deter the sale of oil and gas that prop up the Russian military. He could press European governments to devote to Ukraine’s defense and rebuilding the $300bn of sovereign Russian assets that are now frozen in western accounts.
It is deeply disturbing that matters of war and peace, democracy and autocracy, depend on stroking and flattering the fragile ego of the self-absorbed Trump. But that is the world we live in.
European leaders have an essential role to play in nudging him in the right direction. They must get Trump to overcome his usual disdain for democratic rule, and admiration for autocrats like Putin, to acknowledge the centrality of defending Ukraine’s democracy for any fair resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
These are counterintuitive steps for the American president. But if he wants to orchestrate an end to the horrible slaughter in Ukraine, he will have to summon the vision to take them.
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Kenneth Roth, former executive director of Human Rights Watch (1993-2022), is a visiting professor at Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs. His new book, Righting Wrongs: Three Decades on the Front Lines Battling Abusive Governments, was published by Knopf and Allen Lane
